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~D'i310 
PHILOSOPHICAL MYSTICISM AS EPISTEMOLOGICAL METHOD 
CHAPTER I 
THE DEFINITION OF MYSTICISM 
1. Mz~ticism as ~ Religious Attitude: 
The general problem of the definition of mysticism 
may be approached in either of two ways. We might as­
semble the elements of all types and method of mysticism, 
and, by the use of the critical method, arrive thereby 
at a description and definit:!.on of the mystical experi­
ence in its most general sense; or we might develop 
a restricted, speciflc definition by ignoring certain 
aspects of that type of experience which might, in a 
broad, general sense, be called mystical. The present 
topiC, by its very statement as a philosophical inves­
tigation, has already been thus restricted and limited. 
Only indirectly will there be any occasion to inquire 
into those experiences which are ordinarily and popu­
larly called 'mysti cal'. On the other hand, it! is the 
purpose of this discus_slon to define and illustrate 
philosophical mysticism, and in order to do this 
effectlvely it will be necessary to distinguish the 
experience we have chosen to call philosophical 
(3 ) 
4. 
mysticism from all other experiences whinh have been 
variously classified as instances of the mystical 
attitude. 
Broad, general definitions of mysticism illus­
trate the fallacy common to all such definitions, 
namely, the substance of the term defined is lost 
in the attempt to extend it over an indefinite number 
of instances or occasions of the experience. It then 
becomes necessary to correct such rhetorical state­
llients by means of further definitions, more specific 
and restricted in nature. An idea of the general 
nature Qf such definitions may be had from the follow­
ing examples: 
" ••••direct ,mion of the human soul with the 
Divinity through contemplation and love •••based Of 
direct and immediate intuition of the Infinite." 
" •••• direct intercourse with God••• subject and ob­ject are fused into an undifferent~ated one ••• soul 
is identical with what it kll 0WS." --­
"•••• uuion with the Deity•••by ecstatic contempla­
tion." ~ 
1. Sauvage, G.M., 
2. Jones, R.M., 
3. Blunt, ,J.R., 
article on "Mysticism" in The Catholic 
'Encyclopedia. ~ -
article on "Mysticism" in the Encyclo­
pedia of Religion and Ethig~. 
art icle OD "Mysticism" in DictiC!.~ of 
Sects, HereSies, Ecc~~si~l~~ ~ties,Etc. ­
5. 
1I •••• emphasis on immediat.., experience of God, a 
direct and intimate consciousness of divine Reality." 4 
II ••••un mode de connaiasance etrangers 6.t sUj?erieurs 
a llellistence et a. la connaissance normales. 5 
Here we have five general stateYllenta concerning 
mystiCism, but not a single definl tion. As defin:l.tions, 
the above instances would take the form: A .!! A. It :is 
not illuminating to learn that the mystical experience 
Is ecstatic contemplat:ion, that it is direct intercourse 
with God, that it is immediate experience of God, or 
that :l.ts knowledge is extraneous and superior to the 
ordinary forms of thought. The tl'uth of these stat6­
m3nts is uIIcri.t:tcally assumed by t he mystic, whereas 
these very statements themselves furnish or constitut e 
the problem for our iIlvestigation. 
The more specific and definite statements of 
mysticism err, not in an exces s of generality, but in 
seeming to lose the term t h ey are defining in the very 
particularity of the definition. Thus Montague, 6 in an 
attetllpt to define mysti cism as a method of knowledge, 
succeeds only in defining the term "mysticismll out of 
4. Mathews and Smith, article on "Mysticismnin Dictionary 
of Religlon .!ill! Ethics. 
5. Lalande, A., article OIl IIMysticismll de la Philosophie. in Vocabulaire _ ...._ ­
6. Montague, W.P., The Ways of Knowing, New York, 1925, 
Ch. III. 
6. 
existence. or at least out of his discussion. by some­
thing which approaches a reductio ad absurdum of the 
two possible alternative explanations of mysticism. 
In the first place. he attempts to rationalize the 
mystical experience by defining. as mystical. acts of 
thought which could by no stretch of imagination be 
Classified as mystical experience. The obvious fail~e 
to explain mysticism by this method forces him to the 
other alternative. wherein he explains away the experi­
ence of mysticism by an appeal to the subconscious, an 
explanation of which we shall have more to say presently. 
The objection might be made that Montague is not a 
mystic. but a logiCian trying to make mysticism logical. 
Mysticism, it may be said. has the right to its own 
reprssentatives. Then let us examine some accounts of 
mystical experience given by mystics and see if they 
are more satisfying. We have noted that Montague de­
fined mysticism out of existence by making acts mystical 
which could not be correctly classified as mystical. 01' 
by plaCing the mystical experience in the subconscious, 
beyond explanation or description. Those who might 
proporly be called mystics arrive at the same end by an 
opposite procedure: namely, the attempt to define as 
mystical a kind or class of experience for which there 
cml be claimed no epistemological validity whatever. 
Thus Miss Undln'hill, a contemporary exponent of what 
7. 
might be called practical or applied mysticism. tells 
us that 
" •••• in mysticism the w111 is united with the emo­
tions in an impas~ioned desire to transcend the 
sense-world•••• " 
II It is not merely the power of' contemplating 
Eternity. It is the name of the organic process 
which involvesethe perfect COnS\Ulllllation of the 
Love of God." 
Here. and throughout this book and others. we find a 
queer combination of' such terms as desire. will. sense. 
organic process. and contemplation. illustrating the 
indeterminateness of terminology which is characteris­
tic of. although not peculiar to. treatments of mysti­
cism. In no other f'ield are we asked to accept. as 
actual and real, visions which are subjective experi­
ences of pure objectivity; super-natural. super-normal. 
snd super-rational experiences that do not fall within 
the field of the occult; or super-normal visions that 
dictate categorical rules for practical activity. This 
criticism is not intended to apply only to Miss Under­
hill's work; but it would be a waste of' space to give 
extended examples of a characteristic which is well­
known to any who have the least acquaintance with the 
literature of mysticism. 
Despite the irregularity and lack of' precision in 
7. Underhill. Evelyn. Mysticism, New York, 1926, p.79. 
8. P.84. 
8. 
these treatments of mysticism, we find one element or 
characteristic common and peculiar to all definitions 
of the mystical experience. This is the quality of 
immediacy. I fail to find a single instance in which 
it is suggested that the mystical experience is mediat­
ed. Its very essence is its immediacy; and it is this 
immediacy which gives to the mystic his ground of 
assurance and certainty. The mystical problem of 
immediate experience is not, however, to be identified 
with the problem of the same name in philosophy. Where­
&8 philosophy is interested in the problem of the possi­
bility of immediate experience as a source of knowledge, 
the mystic assumes the epistemological validity of immed­
iate intuition. His own subjective experience 1s proof 
enough, for him, of the real existence of the immediate 
experience as an experience; and mystics, on the whole, 
s.re consist ent in their subjectivity, making no claims 
for the objectivity of the mystical experience itself, 
although they may request recognition of the objective 
validity of its results. For the mystic, the truth and 
reality of an experience is guaranteed if it can be 
shown to be an immediate experience. Argument on this 
question must be postponed; our concern at this point 
is merely to identify mystical experience as immediate 
experience. 
The methodlor modes of attaining the immediate 
9. 
intuition which is assumed to be the essence of the 
mystical experience may be classified as of tl~ee 
general types. We must, however, keep in mIld that 
these divisions are not exclusive, but overlap, and 
serve only as general distinctions. These three modes 
of i~nediate experience are: 
1. Abnormal hallucination; 
2. Ecstatic Vision; and, 
3. Rational insight. 
The disciplines into which these modes broadly 
fit are then: 1. psychology; 2. religion; and, 3. 
philosophy. An example of the first mode is to be 
found in the frenzied raving of the dervish, in epi­
leptiC seizure, and in trances of various types and 
origins. This sort of experience, if such we may call 
it, we shall exclude as obviously falling outside our 
subject matter because of its failure to meet the re­
quiroments of intelligibility. There may be some crit­
icism of this demand for intelligibility on the ground 
that it is an attempt to criticize immediate experience 
for not being mediate; but by 'intelligible' is meant 
merely that Wllich is comprehensible and therefore 
acceptable as valid experience, implying by 'comprehen­
sible' that which has a determinate meaning. 
All abnormal experience, then, such as dreams, 
hallucinatlons, and, in particular, all functioning of 
the so-called subconscious are, for the reasons given, 
10. 
removed from our field of investigation. This problem 
of the subconscious will_ however, appear again in our 
discussion of the second mode of immediate experience, 
so we shall proceed directly to the discussion of that 
mode. 
In ordinary connections, mysticism is usually 
thought of as a characteristically religious attitllde: 
both myst:tcisl11 and religion are primarily concerned 
with the relations of God and man. Consequently, defi­
nitions such as those quoted above tend to treat mysti­
Cism, evon in a general sense, as a type of religious 
behavior. This is quite reasonable, but the mistake ,too 
commonly made is that of presuming the mere act of term­
ing a religious judgment mystical to constitute a ground 
for its acceptance as logically valid experience. The 
general use of the term "religious" may signify any 
experience from the completely abnormal and irrational 
to the completely rational. Nevertheless, mysticism is 
a fundamental and essential element of any att:l.tude or 
,doctrine which might be called religious; and we might 
even contend that the validity of religion depends, to 
a great extent, upon the determination of the validity 
of its mystical content. The point here is that the 
mel'S presence of mystiCism within experience is no 
quarantee of the validity of that mystical element as ,- a 
,-j 
11. 
knowledge. 
The second mode of our classification, that of 
ecstatic vision, refers to the specifically religious 
type of mysticism. This manifestation of religiolls 
experience rests, whether so recognized or not, on a 
strict cosmological dualism. Communion with the infi­
nite is made possible only by transcending the finite; 
to reach God the mystic must get away from the world; 
hence we find the demand for visions and insights as 
the methods of thus transcending the material. Theology 
thus presents a conflict between the rationalistic and 
mystical pOints of view, the former emphasizing the 
wisdom of God as mediated to man and the latter stress­
ing the ultimate validity o.r inunediately intuited know­
lodge of infinite reality. 
Reference has already been made to the common 
characteristic of all definitions of mystiCism, the 
quality of immediacy. By immediate these definitions
--
• 	 mean unmediated in the strictest sense. The terlU 
9 immed~ has sometimes been used in philosophy in a 
sense not contradictory to mediate, but rather as its 
I. §.~., the Intuitionists' attempts to define intuition 
as 'acquired', as in Bergson. 
12. 
contrary; but such a distinction will not hold for the 
definitions of mystical experience. By immediate the 
above definitions mean non-relational; that ;s. either 
sub-relational or above and beyond relations, Moreover. 
the mystical experience claims. in its purest forms. to 
be completely and entirely an experience of immediacy; 
an experience. that .1.s. in which subject and object 
are completely and wholly identified. This is nothing 
more than the contention that the mystical conscious­
ness is a state in which awareness or attention. as 
cognitive. is not present. Now if this serves to de­
3cribe our second mode, that of ecstatic vision or 
religious mysticism. then the criticism of this mode 
from the standpoint of philosophy and logic is patent. 
What possible reality or existence can be attributed to 
an experience which is not even a condition of awareness? 
Critical philosophy informs .s that awareness is the 
primary and fundamental condition of any state of cog­
nition. and by cognition we mean an experience of know­
ing. not a mere mental state. 
How, then, can these apparently contradictory char­
acteristics of the mystical consciousness be harmonized? 
How can mysticism be an experience of cognition and yet 
lack awareness? Two attempts have been made to explain 
this paradox. The rational attempt makes of religious 
13. 
mysticism something very much like the experience we 
have chosen to call philosophical mysticism. The other 
attelupt is a psychological explanatlon and results In 
the reduction of religious mysticism to the level of 
abnormal and hallucinatory experience by a more or less 
exact identification of the mystical consciousness with 
the subconscious. Other explanations of religious mysti­
cism have been made which appeal to the notion of the 
super-conscious rather than to the subconscious; but 
these inevitably end in a philosophy of "genius" or "the 
elect", a view wbich practical theology finds exoeedingly 
difficult. 
The most popular exponent of the psychological ex­
planation of religious mysticism is William James. Hls 
10lectures on the Varieti~ of Religious Experience pre­
sented the straw which religion, committing s~icide in 
the sea of science, grasped with a death-grip. Any ade­
quate or detailed discussion of psychological theory Is 
beyond our prosent topic; but suoh a lengthy examination 
is not necessary to bring out the fallacies apparent, 
first, in the attempt to make psychology a complete and 
final explanation of experience, and second, in the 
10. New York, 1925. 
14. 
attempted explanation of the subconscious as a condition 
of cognition, and finally, in Professor James' exposi­
tion of the grounds of religious mysticism. If this can 
be done, we shall then have reduced the field of investi­
gation to that form of mysticism called philosophical, 
which corresponds to what we have previously called 
rational insight. Any remaining content of religious 
mysticism not already explained as abnormal hallucina­
tion or ecstatic vision will readily lend itself to 
philosophical explanation. 
The subconscious is a hypothetical entity construct­
ed to explain certain observable facts of action for 
which no explanation can be found under the laws and 
rules of psychology as generally formulated. No fact 
nor instance of experience can be reduced wholly to 
psychological terms, and the reuson why any given fact 
of experience, conscious or subconscious, is incapable 
of final explanation in psychological terms is merely 
this: psychological explanation consists in the attri­
bution, to a given fact or to a series of facts, of one 
or more qualities which psychology has found to be com­
ponents of experience. The procedure can best be explain­
ed by a physical analogy. Suppose a chemist were to 
attempt an explanation of the compound H20 by an elabo­
rate exposition of the qualities and characteristics of 
hydrogen and of oxygen as independent, unrelated elements. 
15. 
He could not thereby arrive at any notion of water, but 
would forever be restricted to the elemental notiolls of 
hydrogen and oxygen as independent, unique entities. No 
competent sCientist, however, is guilty of this simple 
and na~ve error. He realizes that any adequate descrip­
tion of the element hydrogen will necessarily include a 
description of the combining and reacting properties 
and qualities of hydrogen in relation to every other 
known element and substanco. We demand such consistency 
of the physical SCientist; but we permit the psycholo­
gist to abstract elements from experience, to hyposta­
tize them into laws and for~Ylae, and then we accept as 
final his attempt to explain experience by the manipu­
lation of these abstract, hypostatized fragments of 
expeJ:'ience. 
This is exactly the procedure of explanation in 
terms of the subconscious. The so-called subconscious 
is meJ:'ely one phase OJ:' aspect of the expeJ:'ience of 
knowing. The subconscious does not exist apart fJ:'om, 
and unJ:'elated to, the other component parts of the cog­
nitive function, such as awareness, feeling, imagina­
tion, will, etc. To attempt an explanation of cognition 
by reference to one of these aspects abstracted from the 
whole function is to construct an argument both incom­
plete and inconsequential. The psychol ogist is forced to 
16. 
a oonsideration of the function as a whole before any 
meaningful or consistent explanation of the subconscious 
can be given. This cannot be done e.xcept by showing how 
the subconscious arises as an intrinsio aspect of the 
interrelated whole of cognition; and this whole of cog­
nition is the necessary condition of any genuine validity 
of knowledge. The subconscious, then, as incomplete cog­
nition, can make no claim of knowledge content. 
James is right when he says that "the subconscious 
!!.!1! is nowadays a well-credited psychological entity",11 
but we can hardly agree with his further statement that 
"in it we have exactly the mediating term required" to 
12
explain mystical experience. The very fact that the 
subconscious is a psychological entity, and nothing 
more, should be enough to inform us that it is not a 
mediating term and that any attempt to explain mysticism 
in terms of such a hypothetical entity can result only 
in disaster for the mystical experience itself. Acoord­
ing to James, the subconscious, as a mediating term, is 
13
that which effects our union with the "more"; but he 
11. £2. cit., p.5l1. The passages quoted are taken as 
representing a consistent summation of James' entire 
argument concerning religious mysticism. 
12. P.5ll. 
13. P. 511 f. 
17. 
fails jo give any adequate definition of just what this 
"more" is; so, with one term left undefined, the propo­
sition means little, if anything, since the meaning of 
the relation is primarily dependent upon the meaning of 
its terms. A more obvious logical fallacy is present in 
his important premise that °there is actually and liter­
ally more 	 life in our total soul than we are at any time 
14 
aware of". This statement is at one and the same time 
both premise and conclusion of James' entire argument, 
constituting an obvious petitio. Further, even if this 
statement be accepted as a valid premise to his argument 
concerning mysticism, it i8 hard to find justification 
for the "hypothesis that••• the 'more' with which in 
religious experience we feel ourselves connected is on 
its hither side the subconscious continuation of our 
conscious life"o15 This may, as James suggests, "preserve 
a contact wi<th 'science' whiCh the ordinary theologian 
16 
lacks", but it at the same time succeeds adJnirably in 
defining out of existence both mysticism and experience 
as valid te~s for epistemology. 
The attempt of psychology to explain, by. the use of 
involved and technical phraseology, a state of cognition 
from which the essential condition of awareness is absent 
14, .P. 511. 
15. P. 512. 
16. P. 512. 
18. 
is neither convincing nor significant. The expressions 
"subconscious awareness" and "subconscious thought" are 
a,;oh obvious contradictions in terms that it is hard to 
conceive how phllosophers of .Tames' capacity could resort 
to them. In short. the subconscious. as an entity. is 
not intelligible; and as an explanatory principle it 
must be rejected by philosophy as at least of doubtful 
validity. In so far as religious mysticism relies on 
the psychology of the subconSCious to justi.fy its claim. 
to be a valid method of knowledge. just so far will the 
mystical experience be considered outside the field of 
philosophic investigation. It would not be just. however. 
thus to classify all religious mysticism; our criticism 
here is directed at its reliance upon psychology as an 
explanatory method. 
2. Mysticism!!!! .! Method E..f. Kno\'11edge: 
We have. by the exclusion of abnormal and sub­
conscious phenomena. narrowed our field of invostigation 
to that region of experience which may be deSignated as 
philosophical mysticism. This. as we have already con­
tended. is encompassed by the third and highest stage of 
mystical experience. rational insight. The problem now 
confronting us is this: Precisely what .kind or kinds of 
experience can we discover. which might be termed mystical. 
19. 
which have not already been excluded by the previous 
argument? Reduced to its simplest terms this problem 
becomes that of whether or not the terms philosophical 
and mystical are in any sense inclusive I or are abso­
lutely exclusive. I am prepared to admit that the use 
of the term mysticism as falling within the denotation 
of the general term philosophI is not in accord with my 
previous insistence upon the use of precise terminology. 
My apology for this is that it is a concession to popu­
lar usage; the term mystical has been used in a wide 
variety and range of meanings, and it has frequently 
been applied to philoBOphYI often to the more rational­
istic systems; e.g' l to the philosophies of Plato l 
Spinozal Kantl Regel l and Bradley. It might be argued 
that in so far as philosophers are mystical they are thus 
far not philosophers; but our purpose is to attempt an 
explanation of what is meant by the adjective mystical 
when applied specifically to a system of philosophy. If 
this can be done l it should then be evident whether it 
is justifiable to apply the term mystical to philosophy 
or whe'ther this does in fact constitute a tacit reduction 
of the one to the other. The work of F.H. Bradley has 
been selected as the best example of a system which 
attempts to combine the elements of logic and of mysti-
Cism, the respective methods of philosophy and religion; 
20. 
9.nd a critlcal discusslon or Bradley's philosophy will 
const1.tute the body or our argument at a later pOint. 
It was suggested above that the problem of 
mysticism is essenti~lly the problem of mediate and 
immediate experience. Further, we noted that this is 
not, 9.t least admittedly, a problem for the mystlc 
himself, inasmuch as.mysticism assumes the possibility, 
existence, actuality, 9.nd reality of immediate experi­
ence as a source or method of knowledge. Herein lies 
the distinction between the philosophieal type of 
mystieism and all its other forms. The method of phil­
osophy is fundamentally and primarily crit1.cal, and 
it has only one approach to the problem of mysticism: 
namely, a crltical enquiry into the assumed validity 
of the mystical intultlon through an investigatlon of 
the so-called mystice.l consej.ousness. Philosophical 
mysticism then becomes an investigation of immediate 
experience, whereas ordlnary mysticism is a ~tatement 
of the methods and conclusions of immediate intuition. 
The sole distinguishing negative feature of 
philosophical mysticism is that it doos not admit the 
mystic's presumption of tho certainty and valldity of 
immediate intuition as a method of knowledge. This, 
for philosophy, is a matter for investlgation in the 
same manner that philosophy must lnvestigate the preill­
21. 
ill.ses and assumptions of every argUlllent in every field. 
This gives to the term philosophic~ mysticism a defi­
nite and justifiable content of meaning as well as a 
limited denotation. It does not admit without question 
unproved assumptions concerning the validity of the 
mystical experience, but, on the other hand, it does 
not dogmatically deny that this experience may possess 
validity; it does not attempt to develop or discover a 
consistent mystical experience, but neither does it 
disregard the existential claims of mystical intuition. 
The philosopher, then, may very well recognize a mysti­
cal intuition, but he is not justified in calling his 
experience philosophical untH he has proved immediate 
experience valid. 
What, exactly, constitutes the philosophical vali­
dation of an experience? The method of philosophy haa 
already been defined as logic; so it would seem tbat 
an experience could be called philosophical only after 
it bad been formulated, or found capable of formulation, 
in logical terms. This is precisely what is meant by 
philosophical critf cism. Action, thought, and experience 
must be reduced to logical terms in order to be compre­
hended; and this is what was meant by the demand that 
the mystical experience be intelligible. No definite­
ness of meaning or content can be assigned to any phenom­
22. 
ena not capable of logical statement. The very terms 
employed to designate a statement of knowledge ­
proposition, judgment, terms - all are logical terms 
and imply logical formulation. 
Now we have permitted ou~selves to become in­
volved in a dangerous dilemma. First, we have said 
that mysticism has traditionally denied to philosophy 
the right to subject mystical intuition to logical 
analysis because, it is claimed, mysticism transcends 
the ordinary processes of thought and logic. We then 
proceed to deny this by saying that mystical experi­
ence must be formulated logically if it is to be either 
valid or intelligible. One simple way out of the dilemma 
would be to deny flatly that mysticism is either valid 
or intelligible; but, although it is conceivable that 
this might be the true solution, mere denial hardly 
constitutes a philosophical argument. 
We shall find it imperative, however, to take 
issue at the outset with any form of mysticism which 
refuses to submit its method or conclusion to logical 
fornmlation. Traditional mystiCism, in so far as it 
makes claim to transcend thought and denies thereby 
the necessity of logic, must therefore be rejected. 
I shall cl&.1m that the boundaries of the intelligib1l­
ity, comprehension, and even of the reality of knowledge 
23. 
lie within the realm of logical formulation. Briefly, 
this means that the limits of the poss1bility of 
knowledge are circumscribed by logic, logic being de­
fined as the method of critical thought. Every argu­
ment rests finally upon one or mora assumptions, but, 
at the beginning of any discussion, it 1s necessary 
to recognize these assumptions for what they are; and 
the primary validity of any argument wi~l depend upon 
the logical validity of its assumptionso 
The apparent contradiction between our topic for 
discussion and our logical position m1ght appear less 
formidable, however, if we remember that intuition and 
logical formulation indicate two distinguishable runc­
t10ns or activities of thought. We may even contend 
that they are distinguishable forms of knowing, each 
of which contains elements or aspects necessary to the 
knowledge experience. If this should be found to be the 
actual case, then it may well be true that the immediate 
intuition of mystical experience is valid and justified 
and yet dependent, in the ultimate analysis, upon logi­
cal formulation. 
At any rate, for the present we insist that mystical 
experience, which we define in terms of immediacy, must 
be an activity, the conclusions of which are capable of 
for~~lation in logical terms. If this involves the 
24. 
rejection of mysticism as contrary to philosophy, then 
so be it. The statement of this problem in both histor­
ical and critical form is the purpose of the discussion 
to follow. 
CHAPTER II 
MYSTICISM IN PHILOSOPHY 
Three philosophers have been selected as affording 
examples of philosophical mysticism: namely, Plato, 
Spinoza, and Bradley. The first two, Plato and Spinoza, 
will be treated as imperfect types; that is, the mysti­
cal element present in these philosophical systems is 
not consistent with the whole structure of the systems. 
The mysticism of Plato is not an integral, and intrinsic 
element of his philosophy, but an attitude of misappre­
hension engendered by prejudiced interpretation. The 
philosophy of Spinoza, on the other hand, gives evidence 
of an intrinsic element of mysticism, although its 
presence within the system appears somewhat in the 
nature of a contradiction. In Bre.dley, for the first 
and perhaps the only time in the history ,of philosophy, 
speculation arrives at a mysticism which, from Bradley's 
point of View, is the necessary and consistent fruition 
or conclusion of any logical system. Bradley's affirma­
tion of immediate experience as the source of our know­
ledge of reality contains nothing which is not dorivable 
by logical implication and inference from his system of 
(25 ) 
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metaphysics. It will be our purpose, in due time, to 
stress the point that Bradley's mysticism is not an 
adventitious supplement to his logic, inasmuch as it 
is derived from, and is inherent in, his system of 
logic; that is, mystj,cism is a necessary inference 
from his logical premises. 
These three examples will not, of course, exhaust 
the field of philosophical mysticism, n~ will the 
treatment here be in any way inclusive or exhaustive 
of the content of the philosophy of Plato, Spinoza, or 
Bradley. The problem for discussion, as stated, is the 
determination of that meaning and content which makes 
it both possible and necessary that we attribute to 
these philosophies an element of philosophical mysticismo 
3. 	Plato the Artist: 
Whitehead has said: "Even to this day Plato is 
mainly valued as a religious mystic and a supreme 
1 
literary arttst". To call Plato an artist does not 
in any sense limit his aesthetic acttvity to the per­
fection of a beautiful literary style. Plato was not 
1. Whitehead, A. N., Adventures of Ideas, New York, 1933, 
p. 70. 
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an 	author concerned with the production of an impressive 
style, nor was he a sophist whose only end was the es­
tablishment of his argument. 
Plato may truly be called an artist because his 
approach to the problems of life with which he was con­
cerned was primarily and fundamentally an aesthetic 
approach. This is no more peculiar to Plato than to 
the great majorlty of the Greek thinkers and writers 
of the Golden Age. This aesthetic attitude is particu­
larly evident in the philosophers of the Academy; the 
attitude of presupposing the harmony of real and ideal, 
the failure to distinguish subject and object, .and the 
complete identification of purpose, end, means, and 
object are clear indications that, for the ,Greek, life 
2itself was an elemental aesthetic function. In the 
interpretation of Greek thought, much error would be 
avoided if critics were cognizant of, and attentive to, 
the peculiar connotation of Greek terms. 
The question of Plato1s mysticism is inextricably 
bound up with his use of myth. One interpretation quite 
2. 	A much better statement of the point I am here attempt­
ing to make is to be found in E. Jordan, Forms of 
Individuality, Indianapolis, 1927, p.257 : "Th1T 
identification of will with the nature of things gave 
the consciousness of the ultimate esthetic satiSfac­
toriness of things which resulted in the fusion of 
fact with thought in the perfected objective systems 
of ancient Greek life H• 
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commonly met with is that Plato's use of myth indicates 
a retreat from philosophy to a crude type of mysticism. 
Zeller is of this opinion when he states: "The Platonic 
myths, in short, almost always pOint to a gap in sci­
3
entific knowledge", Stace likewise says that "wherever 
Plato is unable to explain anything, he covers up the 
4 gap in his system with a myth". 
This notion that the Platonic myths are not allegor­
ical, but that their meaning consists both in their 
,literal sense and in the feeling Which they call up, 
has been most extensively and ably presented by J.A. 
5Stewart. With all due respect to Professor Stewart's 
linguistic abilities, we cannot but reject his in­
terpretation of Plato as resting upon a more or less 
complete misunderstanding and misconception of Greek 
philosophy, which is fatal to any adequate interpreta­
tion of the thought of Plato in particular, 
Plato's method is primarily that of the dialectic, 
but his method is so varied and so unschemat:l.c that 
Whitsh sad has called him "the greatest metaphysician, 
'---~~'--'--"-----'-----
3. Zeller, E., Plato ~~ Older ,{!.cademy, London, 1888, 
p. 161. 
4. 	Stace, W.T., CritIcal History 6f Greek Philosophy, 
New York, 1920, p. 171. 
5. Stewart, J.A., Jhe }.1yths of Plato, London, 1905. 
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the poorest systematic thinker".6 This lack o~ system­
atization is the direct result of what we may rather 
ambiguously call Plato's aesthetic inspiration or 
artistic creativity. Sometimes it appears questionable 
whether a too brilliant literary style is an asset or 
a liability to the writer of philosophy; literattwe is 
so liable to the criticisms of "mere rhetoric" and 
"literary logic". So it is with Plato. We ~ollow easlly, 
yet with precision, his dialectical development of an 
argument; and then, suddenly, just as the problem 
appears to be working itself into logical formulation, 
Plato tells us a story. To the 10gical-IDinded, Plato 
must sometimes appear the master of anti ..climax. His 
method forces us, if we are to grasp the true natcwe 
of his problem, to complete the logical formulation 
in our own terms. 
I cannot believe that Plato's introduction of 
myths at critical points in his argument is any indi­
oation that he despaired of logiC as a means to formu­
late his problem. Rather, like the artist who first 
sees clearly the piotcwe he wants to paint and then 
wonders what materials and instruments he shall use 
to create it, so Plato formulated his own understand­
6. ~. ~., p. 213. 
----------------------
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ing in torms most easily grasped by his listeners and 
readers. Whether .Plato was conscious of each inter­
mediate step in the logical formulation of these argu­
ments or whether his coordination of thought was so 
perfected that he virtually leaped to an understanding 
of the whole is really not ·the question. What is pre­
sentod in each myth is not an appeal to mysticism, but 
the statement of a portion of the argument which would 
have been exceedingly difficult to make clear to his 
listeners in strict logical terms, terms which tend 
to abstractness. Zeller, Stace, and Stewart accuse 
Plato of a mysticism the crudity and puerility of which 
are certainly not consistent with his magnitude in other 
respects. If their criticism is just, then Plato is 
guilty of a 'fault so grievous' that it really need not 
concern us here, for such mythological mysticism has no 
philosophical significance. 
It 1s significant, however, that Plato's most 
competent student saw no mystiCism in his teacher's 
work, but proceeded to reduce his arguments to strict 
logical and dogmatic form, regardless of their form of 
presentation, logical or mythical. Aristotle accepted 
7
the doctrine of Ideas as dogma, not as myth. Further I 
7. pf. Ueberweg, F., Historz of Philos~~hl' trans. Geo.S. Morris, ~r , 1873, Vol. II, 
P. 119; and Stewart, ££. Cit., p.347. 
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the ent1re academy interpreted Plato in this way,8 and 
the only two alternative systems of philosophy recog­
nized by this worthy school were Platonism (including 
the work of Aristotle) and Stoicism. Cicero considered 
Aristotle to be the systematizer of Plato, and it seems 
reasonable to suppose that the exeget1cal authority of 
these contemporaries is somewhat more reliable than 
that of later theologians. 9 
I say Ilater theologians I because it is from these 
that the mystical interpretation of Plato proceeded. 
According to Taylor,lO PIB.to appears in Western thought 
through the channels of Augustine, Boethius, Dionysius 
the Areopagite, and Plotinus. In other words, for 
Western thought Platoniam becomes Neo-Platonism, and 
the latter is accepted, without criticism, as the valid 
interpretation of Plato. Dean Inge, for example, in­
cludes a chapter entitled "Platonism" in his work on 
Christian Mysticism, but fails, in this chapter, to 
make a single necessary or valuable remark about Plato, 
concentrating his attention almost entirely on the work 
8. 	Taylor, A.E., Platonism and its Influence, New York,
1922, pp.8·=I'15."­
9. 	Cf., Taylor, 22.~it., Ch.I; Ueberweg, ~.~., Vol.I, 
p.119; Adamson, R., Develo1ment of Greek Philosophy, 
London, 1908, p.149. See a so Stewart1s acceptance of 
Milton1s interpretation of Plato in preference to that 
of Aristotle, £2.cit., p.347. 
lO.~. ~., p.20. 
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of Plotinus. Now the Plato of Plotinus, or of Augustine 
or Boethius or Dionysius, is by no means the Plato of 
Aristotle, or we might say, the Plato 1fAaTowgs • Neo­
Platonism, like so many Neo's, is a . foster child whose 
resemblance to the parent is slight. 
As an instance of later interpre'atloB, we find 
the popular "ladder of ideas" or "sories of emanations" 
as a distinct and peculiar interpretation of Plato's 
doctrine of Ideas. No corresponding theory is to be 
found in Plato's own words. Yet this notion of know­
ledge as a hierarchy of mystical insights is the 
source of a vast majority of the attempts to read 
mysticism into the thought of Plato. Any attempt to 
derive mysticism from Plato himself will consist in 
the peculiar and special interpretation of some of 
Plato's undogmatic, and perhaps i ndefinite, expressions, 
as, for example, hlsfailure to "assume that the more 
fundamental factors of experience will lend themselves 
:u 
to discrimination", or the fact that his dialogues are 
"permeated with a sense of the variousness of the Uni­
12
varse". That such moot questions of interpretation 
are to be found in Plato is indisputable; but I contend 
11. Whitehead, ~. £li., p.225. 
12. Ibid., p. 65. 
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that they can be solved only by reference to the whole 
of his philosophy and by recognition of the exegetical 
competence of his contemporaries, who at least inter­
preted his philosophy as a consistent system. 
Burnet's admirable statement concerning Plato 
furnishes a fitting conclusion to our discussion here: 
" •• .••allegory and myth are not employed to express 
something above reason, but to adumbrate what is below 
13 
reason, so far as that can be done at all", a state­
ment which will assume more meaning as our discussion 
progresses. In a sense, it is the sceptical impli­
cation contained in the final clause of Burnet's 
statement which constitutes our problem. 
4. Spinoza!a! Moralist: 
As in our discussion of P1ato~ we shall have more 
to say in criticism of contemporary interpretations of 
Spinoza than in reference to his work itself. This 
procedure is in both cases due to the fact that the 
supposed mystical content of Plato and Spinoza is in 
a large measure due to, or colored by, these inter­
pretations. We have assumed that the reader is familiar 
with the general content of these systems of philosophy 
13. Burnet, J., Greok Philosophy, R!.I, Tba1es to Plato, 
London, 1928, p.16? 
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and have confined the present discussion to the in­
vestigation of any content therein which might be 
called philosophical mysticism. 
The commentators upon Spinoza meet with a very 
serious difficulty in the intimate and intrinsic 
combination and coordination, within his system, of 
elements both rationalistic and mystical; and the 
reader is hard put to it in his attempt to classify 
Spinoza as either a rationalist or a mystic. 
In the first place, philosophy has by no means 
rid itself of the fallacy of ambiguity, and these 
are particularly evident in the so-called "popular" 
treatments. The easiest way to resolve a contradic­
tion is by redefining the two contradictory terms 
until their content becomes compatible. The fact 
that this results in the destruction of the meaning 
of the terms is too often overlooked. In relation 
to Spinoza, for instance, we find in Roth's other­
14 
wise admirable work a passage of quite unexpected 
ambiguity. Faced with the contradictory aspects of 
rationalism and mysticism in Spinoza's philosophy, 
Roth adopts the subterfuge of defining the term 
mysticism in such manner as to exclude Spinoza there­
14. Roth, Leon, Spinoza, Boston, 1929. 
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from, at the same time placing him well within the 
term rationalism. Says Rmth: "If mysticism means that 
man cannot know everything, then Spinoza is a mystic. 
But if mysticism means that human search after ~lOW-
ledge is vain, then Spinoza is a rationalist of ration­
15 
alists". This is most certainly an unaccountable and 
unsupportable limitation of the content of mysticism. 
Roth himself proceeds to elaborate that aspect of 
Spinozals philosophy which has placed him, to all 
appearances at least, within the realm of the mystics. 
First, however, let us review very briefly the 
background of Spinozals mysticism. One factor of 
primary importance in considering the mysticism of 
Spinoza is the fact that his emphasis was so exclusively 
ethical (or practical, in the strict sense of the term). 
He himself tells us that his ultimate end is the in­
vestigation of the means whereby man may attain eternll 
16 
happiness. Hence Spinoza's first and last endeavor 
is to formulate a system of ethics wh1ch will ensure the 
possibility of man's ultimate and eternal satisfaction 
15. P. 55 f. 
16."Treatise on the Correction of the Understanding'~ in 
Sp1noza
' 
s Ethics and "De Intellectua Emelldatione'~ 
trans. A. Boyle, New YOrk, 19l0{Introd.); 1,1 ft. 
Hereinafter referred to as Emend. 
36. 
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or happiness. No matter in what intellectualistic or 
logical or moral terms we define the method of ethics 
and the conduct of life, the fact remains that the end 
of philosophic investigation and speculation is, for 
Spinoza, the attainment of that spiritual rest and 
peace of mind Which constitute the state of happiness 
for man. In this connection, Joachim says that Spinoza 
"is able to give a concrete significance to his ideal 
for human conduct, without introducing into his moral 
;I. 8' 
theory a set of conceptions foreign to his metaphysics' , 
and that consequently we must, befor e we can understand 
Spinoza's ethics, "review his conceptions of 'perfec­
19 
tion' and 'goodness'". This is true, relatively 
speaking, but Spinoza avoided introducing into his 
ethics, conceptions foreign to his metaphysics simply 
because his philosophy proceeded in reverse order; 
that is, he constructed a metaphysic which would suit 
his moral theory. For this reason it is quite impossible 
to understand his conceptions of 'perfection' and 'good­
ness' without first understanding his practical moral 
theory. 
17. 	Spinoza, B. de .. Ethic, trans. W.H.White, Ed.4,
OXldrd, 1930, IV, Appendix 4. (Here­
inafter referred to as Ethic). 
18. 	Joachim, H.H., ! Study of ~ Etlucs of Spinoza, 
Oxford, 1901, ,p.190. 
19. P.238. 
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In the construction of his metaphysic, Spinoza 
did not merely auume the parallelism of thought and 
extension; he did not accept as ~ priori the faet 
that the order and conneetion of ideas corresponds to 
the order and connection of things. This proposition 
was, for Spinoza, in the nature of a presupposition 
made necessary by his fundamental ethical purpose. He 
did not, however, attempt any extended justification 
of this presupposition, and thus there exists an un­
deniable and inescapable contradiction between his 
naturalistic metaphysies and his extremely idealistic 
ethics. (We might venture the mere opinion that Spinoza 
could possibly have rid his system of this apparent 
contradiction, but this is a more or less tacit assump­
tion that Spinoza is fundamentally logical rather than 
mystieal; so, in fairness, let us ignore our opinions 
for the moment.) This contradiction, if such it be, 
leaves us with but two alternatives: we may discard 
Spinoza1s metaphYSics as unsatisfactory and inconsis­
tent with his more logical ethical system, or we may 
bridge the gap by interpreting certain of Spinoza1s 
more or less indefinite statements as mystical in 
nature. We could, of course, admit the possibility of 
a third alternative: namely, that of the identity of 
the metaphysics and the ethiCS; but this would merely 
38. 
transfer the contradiction referred to above from that 
between the ethics and metaphysics to one internal to 
the metaphysical ethics. 
There exists in Spinozals work another breach of 
continulty, one with which we are mOl'e immediately con­
cerned. The mode of advance from the first grade of 
knowledge to the second, from imagination to reason, 
is obvious; bu.t it is not so evident how man arrives 
at the final stage of intuition or scientia intuitiva. 
The intrinsic necessity of scientia intuitiva is 
apparent, not only to complete Spinozals knowledge, 
but also to serve as the ultimate basis of reason. His 
system could be neitheI' completed nor begun without 
this intuition of "individual essences!!. Then determina­
tion of the mystical content of Spinoza lies in the 
definit:l.on of this third and highest grade of knowing. 
To return to our original formulation of the problem: 
Is Spinozals scientia intuit iva mediate or immediate 
in character, or, to be more specific, is the knowledge 
gained from intuition inferrHd or immediately appre­
hended? ThllS is formulated an additional question: Is 
revealed knowledge, or intuition, of the ne.t"re of pre­
suppositlon, in contrast to the logical or inferential 
nature of mediate knowledge? 
It is evident that Spinoza had no intention of 
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making intuition a unique and independent form of know­
ledge. He makes quite clear and definite his stB.tement 
that intuition proceeds from, and. is based upon, the 
two lower grades of knowledge. Especis.lly does intuition 
find a basis of fact and inspiration in the second 
20grade, reaSOn. The development of knowledge is so 
explicitly stated that Joachim is justified in terming 
21 
it "dialectical"; that is, the two lowel' grades are 
absor'bed in the third grade, intuition. Yet, Spinoze. 
is j~st as definite in denying that intuition is a 
mere combination or coordination of the facts gained 
from these lower grades of knowledge. Although he con­
stantly appeals to reason for guidance, and points to 
the development of reason and intelligence as the sole 
22 
means of attaining good and happiness, yet he is con­
tinually insistent that reason and the products of 
deduction are only means to the final intuition, the 
implication being that there is something present in 
intuition beyond the content of mere deduction or in­
rerence. It wou.ld seem that the comprehension of the 
essence of things depends upon an immediate apprehen­
sian of the attributes of God. 
20. 	Cr.,Ethic, V, 28; also II, 40, 2, 
21. 	~. cit., p.252. 
22. 	This is particularly evident in the Ethic, Pt.IV, 
including the Appendix. 
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An excellent, terse statement of the specific prob­
lem in relation to SpinozQ, as well as an indication of 
the more general problem of the valldity of all mystical 
experience, is to be f'ound in Windelband's History.of 
Philosophy, wherein he says that Spinoza's theory of 
cognition " •••• se'ts intuition, as the immediate appl'e­
hension of the eternal logical resulting of. all things 
from God, as knowledge sub specie aeternitatis, above 
23perception and the activity of the intellect". Now 
it this were an exprossion of the only valid inter­
pretation of SpinozQ, we would be obliged, unreserv­
edly, to term him a philosophical mystic, for this 
definition is in substantial agreement with our own 
statement of the essential attributes of philosophical 
mysticism. On the other hand, it appear obvious that 
the above statement is an emphasis of one aspect 
of Splnoza's theory of knowledge. We may, as does 
Windelband, accept it as the element of major impor­
tance in hls system; but this does not justify a com­
plete neglect or disregard of the rationalistic, dia­
lectical element, which undoubtedly had an effect of , 
tremendous importance on Splnoza's system as Ii whole. 
23. New York, 1926, p.409. 
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Hence it appears that we may stress either the 
mystical and immediate or the rational and mediate 
aspect of Spinoza1s epistemology. We may say with. him 
that the starting point of knowledge is an examination 
of the principle of tl~th and that this is given in 
the nature of the understanding itself, or we may refer 
to the fact that the understanding can never descend 
froDI universal axiOD1S to individual things, and then 
inquire as to the source of those universal axioms. 
Thu~ in answer to the question stated above, we seem 
to have a choice of answering that intuition is either 
mediate infererlce or immediate apprehens:l.on or revela­
tion. 
Joachim and Roth illustrate perfectly this ambig­
uous situation. Their interpretations of Spinoza are 
both correct as to detail, but in their general effect 
tend to give the reader an impression of two contra­
dictory notions of Spinozals scientia intultiva. Joachim 
finds, in Spinozals ex.amples, evidence that intuition 
is inference, albeit a kind of illlllllUlent inference which 
. 24 
is itself absorbed in the . final act of intuition. 
Dialectic is the mode of the progression of knowledge, 
24. ~. cit., p.184. 
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and intuition contains within it the two lower grades 
25
of knowing. This interpretation thus minimizes the 
mystical element in Spinoza1s epistemology and empha­
sizes its aspect of rationalism. 
Quite the opposite is true of Roth1s commentary. 
Here we aro told that the second stage of knowledge 
passes into the third only when man becomes conscious 
26 
of his unity with IJ.ature by feeling it within himself. 
Intuition is not discursive; that is to say, it is not 
inferential in character, but it is the internal ac­
quaintance with the inmost constitut1.on of things. 
Thus intuition, says Roth, is very much like that ac­
27 
tivity which Schopenhauer called "artistic vision". 
The whole difficulty, I think, lies in the fact 
that Spinoza carried his metaphysical parallelism 
over into his epistemology, or rather, as indlcated 
above, constructed a metaphysic to correspond with 
his epistemological parallelism. His assumption that 
the order and connection of ideas corresponds, by 
identity, to the order and connection of things is a 
reduction of causality to logical implication, a 
25. QE. cit., p.262. 
26. QE. cit., p.140. 
27. Ibid., p.146. 
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substitution of the concept of ground 	for that of 
cause. Thus he may say that a perfect 	definition 
28
explains the inmost essence of things, and we are 
brought back to the problem of what mode of knowledge 
is available, other than that of immediate apprehen­
sion, from which to constrl,ct such a definition. Here 
is the crux of Spinoza's entire system, the crucial 
point of which he himself either failed to realize or 
neglected to expound. It is these neglected possibil­
ities to which reference was made when it was stated 
that Spinoza might possibly have removed the apparent 
contradiction from his philosophy. 
It may not seem quite fair to leave Spinoza at 
this point, having made no definite statement as to 
his content of philosophical mysticism; but I think 
it will prove more just if we pass directly to ml 
exposition of Bradley's mysticism, for therein we 
shall find, if I am not mistaken, a philosophy which, 
in its sympathy with that of Spinoza, approaches more 
closely that logical perfection at wr~ch the latter 
aimed. Thus, through the expaneive work of Bradley, 
we may come to a better understanding and appreciation 
of Spinoza. 
28. Emend., Sec.95. 
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5. Bradley ~ Logician: 
Quite brief reference to the problem formulated in 
Bradley's Logic will serve to show his intimate connec­
tion with Spinoza and, also, to indicate the future 
trend of our discussion. In the history of modern phil­
osophy there is no thinker whose recognition is so 
disproportionate to his importance as in the case ot 
Bradley. The probable reason for this is the fact that 
Bradley quite effectively controverts most of the ortho­
dox and traditional arguments upon which much contempo­
rary speculation bases its arguments. If some current 
writers on subjects philosophical were better acquaint­
ed with the work of Bradley, they could not find it 
possible to publish page after page of repetitive and 
illogical intellectual floundering, and maintain an 
honest tace. Because Bradley is intellectually honest, 
he represents tor us the true philosopher: his integrity 
is unshakeable; he is solid and schematic without be­
coming dogmatic; he is firm in his conviction, yet 
advances only tentative arguments in proof thereot; he 
is a logieian, but is the first to see the apparent 
inadequacy of logic in his own system. 
In the LogiC, Bradley suocessfully tormulates the 
problem of his metaphysics. His comprehensive discussion 
of thought as relational and discursive forCeS him 
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continually backward, until finally the problem of our 
knowledge of reality forces itself upon his attention. 
Instead of avoiding the problem, or uttering a plati­
tude in its behalf, Bradley sets himself to the task 
of discovering the relation between reality and our 
discursive, relational thought processes. He cannot 
avoid formulating this as the problem of mediate and 
immediate experience. 
The nature and content of mediate inference con­
vinces Bradley that there is at least a nblurred and 
confused totalityll, a primordial feeling, which under­
29 
lies our conscious processes of inference. This 
early and rather indefinite statement of the IIfelt­
unity" or apprehension of totality, which by pre­
supposition makes possible the essential relations and 
differences of thought and inference, reminds us im­
mediately of Spinozals felt and conscious unity of 
man and nature, which is both the ground of intuition 
and the presupposition of imagination and reason; but 
Bradley, unlike Spinoza, neither ignoring nor avoiding 
the fundamental problem raised by no.s epistemology, 
proceeded to an exhaustive investigation of the nature 
of this felt unity, of the mode of its operation, and of 
its relation to the inferential processes of logical 
thought. 
29. Principles of Logic, New York,1920, p.456. 
CHAPTER III 
F.H.BRADL~Y: PHILOSOPHICAL MYSTIC 
If our brief analysis of Bradley's work at the 
conclusion of the foregoing chapter is correct, we are 
justlfied in terming him a philosophical mystic, for 
we have already stated (p.20) that philosophical mysti­
cism is the investigation of the validity of immediate 
experience as knowledge and that this investigation, 
in so far as it is philosophical, will be conf:l.ned to 
logic as its method. This should make clear our posi­
tion that philosophical mysticism is critical rather 
thaD dogmatic; and we have now advanced to a point at 
which we can make a more precise, definitive statement 
of our subject matter. Philosophical mysticism is ~ 
method .2!: system of thoug?t which, 1:..aving advanced to 
the reCOgnition £f immediate experience as ~~e source 
of our contact with reality, llicontends that ~ 
immediate experience has meaning, and becomes intelli­
gible, only ~ formulated in terms of mediate experi­
ence; ~ is, when expressed .!!1 the logical ~ of 
the jUdgment. This latter contention gives rise to the 
investigation of its validity as knowledge. 
(46 ) 
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The present chapter will constitute an attempt to 
discover, from an analysis of his work, whether we are 
justified in attributing to Bradley the epistemological 
method stated in the above definition. In the opinion 
of the writer, few philosophers have been so carelessly 
and inadequately treated as has been Bradley; the reader 
will consequently pardon the present discussion if at 
times it seems to stress unduly some apparently obvious 
points which have been carelessly, or perhaps studiously, 
avoided in contemporary criticism. 
6. ~ Analysis E.f Thought: 
As we have already implied, the problem of mysticism 
is fundamentally the problem of knowledge, a problem to 
which has been attached the term epistemology. Epistemol­
ogy, as a separate field of investigation, seems to have 
had its conception in Locke and its logical formulation 
in Kant's treatment of judgment. While Kant's epistemol­
ogy was essentially logical in nature, constituting an 
investigation of the nature of the act of judgment, at 
t he same time it involved certain psychological observa­
tions which eame as new and unique additions to the 
data of philosophy. Hence, Kant's description of judg­
ment aroused the tremendous controversy concerning the 
separation and opposition of subject and object in the 
48. 
act of knowing. FoDPwing Kant, the attempt was made 
to solve the problem of epistemology on psychologi­
cal grounds, avoiding its logical and metaphysical 
implications, an attempt wlrlch had the negative re­
sult of contusing the issue. 
It is undeniable that psychology does, in a 
sense, furnish the starting point for the investiga­
tion of knowledge and that it provides certain facts 
which must be taken into consideration in any treat­
ment of the epistemological problem, Mere psychology, 
however, can never do more than furnish restricted 
and more or less hypothetical information of an em­
pirical nature; it is therefore inadequate for the 
formulation of the problem of knowing. Bradley was 
perhaps the first to recognize the true value of 
psychology, its importance and its inadequacy; and 
thiS, in itself, lends value to his treatment of the 
problem. Logic held a primary position in Bradley's 
system, not on~y chronologically, but genetically; 
yet he was extremely careful to see that none of his 
logical constructions contradicted the observations 
of psychology. In fact, most of his illustrative 
material is couched in terms and examples of a dis­
tinctly psychological character. 
Before proceeding to an analysis of Bradley's 
treatment of il!ll1lediate experience as a source of 
knowledge, we shall find it both useful and necessary 
to point out just how this particular problem arises 
in his thought. It is not, for ~, a major or pri­
mary subject of investigation, but its consideration 
is necessitated, and assumes tremendous importance, 
as he proceeds in the attempt to define reality and 
the absolute. Bradley's essentially synoptic method 
made it obligatory that he neither allow his logical 
investigation to obliterate psychological fact nor 
permit his formal logic to be contaminated or adul­
terated with psychological views. In other words, his 
logical method was forced to psychology for an ex­
planation of certain aspects of the knowing process, ":: 
1but Bradley's logic never becomes 'psychological'. 
Philosophy, says Bradley, has as its aim the 
I. The reader may perhaps find the following treatment 
of Bradley's philosophy somewhat less detailed and 
specific than that ordinarily to be expected in a 
dissertation of this type. ThiS, I think, may be 
excused on the ground that we are dealing here with 
one whose thought rather uniquely combines a synthetic, 
unschematic vision almost equal to that of Plato with 
the careful regard for details and the slavish insist­
enoe upon precise terminology to be found only in the 
logician. Bradley's system (and here i ,s a philosophy 
which can truly be called a system)would be quite 
vitiated by a textual, word-by-word, casuistic anal­
ysis. Only by attempting to understand his thought 
as a whole and by so interpreting it can we hope to 
arrive at a just ' appreciation of Bradley as a phil­
osopher. ' 
50. 
satisfaction of the intellect:. All. sides of our nature 
demand satisfaction, and in this sense it can be said 
tl1at our whole nature philosophizes. Now it is self­
evident that the intellect can find ultimate satis­
faction only in truth, and truth, in the final analy­
sis, is that which is aoherent and comprehensive. 
nSystem is the arbiter of fact lt , and perfect truth 
must realize the idea of a systematic whole, when we 
mean by truth that which would satisfy the intellect. 
Thought aims at its own satisfaction and contentment 
in a coherent, comprehensive, all-inclusive system 
2 
or whole. 
The question now arises whether or not such a 
system is possible of achievement and whether, in 
fact, such an absolute totality is even capable of 
conception or forw~lation. From an analysis of the 
nature of thought, it becomes evident to Bradley 
that the achievement of this all-inclusive unity 
Abbreviations to follow:
-.- . 
Logic: Bradley~ F.R., The Principles of t8g~C, New York, 
~O, (Reprint of 8 edition). 
A & R: Bradley, F.H., Appearance and Reality, Ed.2, 
London, 19~ 
T & R: Bradley, F.R., Essays on Truth and Reality, 
Oxford, 1914. 
2. 	A & R, p.165 f.; T& R, ChoI, p.188 f., p.2l9f.; 
Ethical Studies, Edo2, Oxford, 1927, pp.248-5C. 
---
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is quite impossible for thought. The most meager de­
scription of thought shows that it is essentially 
relational and discursive; that is to say, the con­
3tent of thought will always take the form of terms.
Now we cannot conceive terms without accepting or 
assuming relations, and it is his insistence upon 
the opposition occasioned by thought's content of 
terms and relations which has caused some to criticize 
Bradley as emphasizing the Hegelian principle of dia­
4lactic in a negative sense only. 
Although terms and relations form the content 
of thought, as mere facts they have no meaning what­
soever of themselves. We cannot even conceive an 
isolated term or relation. l<urther, two or more 
terms and the relations between them would be equal­
ly meru1ingless until made intelligible by logical 
formulation, and the form of this expression is the 
judgment. The perception of a relation between terms 
~~-'---'--'-'---------'---------
3. 	Throughout the discussion of Bradley, we shall 
use "term" in a more limited and abstract sense 
than hi ,g own use. This is done to facilitate the 
explanation, for Bradley's use of "term" implies 
all the explanation and description attempted by 
us here. 
4. 	E.g., DeLaguna, T., "Review of Essays on Truth and 
Reality"in the Journal of Phn')SOPh!, Psychology, ~ 
Scientific .¥ethod, Vol o 12, Pt.I, p~ 58. Cf., Logic, 
p.382; A & R, Ch.XV; T & R, pp.126, 225. 
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or faots is then just this expression of those facts 
as terms of the judgment. Judgment is thus the asser­
tion of the relation of faots. In order to thus relate 
facts, it is necessary that the judgment make reference 
to reality, for only by referring facts to reality 
are they conceived as real and thereby true and mean­
-5 
ingful. 
Thought manifests tp~s continual effort to relate 
terms by reference to reality, in order that its con­
tent may assume meaning and coherence. Thus intellect 
strives toward its goal of satisfaction by attempting 
to establish a relation which will make its content 
of terms complete and all-inclusive. To accomplish 
this, the reality-reference of the judgment would 
have to be one of identity between the subject and 
predicate terms; that is, between reality (as sub­
ject) and fact. 
Hence arises the problem of the essential 
opposition contained in judgment as the formal act 
of thought. I say 'essential' because without this 
discursive and relational character the judgment 
5. 	LogiC, Bk.I, Ch.l; A & R, Ch.XV; ~ R, p.2l0.
Compare the argument following to that of Bosan­
quet on the "a priori character of judgments of 
value", ImEli~ation and Linear Inference, London, 
1920, pp.9 ,150. Bosanquet makes clear the corol­
lary of the above argument, that every judgment 
is a judgment of value. 
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could not exist and thought could not fUnction. 
The very essence o~ thought is the diversity in­
volved in the relation of terms and relations. Yet 
how can thought hope to attain coherence and com­
pleteness i~ its very nature is so necessarily re­
lational and incomplete? It would appear that thought 
is at a continual impasse in its attempt to attain 
that coherent and comprehensive unity which consti­
6 
tutes truth and reality and its ovm satis~action. 
The analysis o~ thought thus demonstrates two 
important ~acts concerning our knowledge. In the 
first place, it is evident that ultimate truth, as 
the satis~action o~ the intellect, is such by nature 
that it can never be completely contained in thought 
and judgment. Secondly, this is true simply because 
the nature of thought is such that it cannot encom­
pass reality. This latter in~erence is derivable from 
the fact that it is only within the absolute unity 
of reality that ultimate truth could be contained. 
Then to attain ulti!llate truth thought would have to 
make the judgment an expression of the totality 
whioh is rsality; Buch attainment is manifestly im­
possible. We cannot identify truth and reality 
6. 	Logic, pp.525-28j A & R, Bk.I (esp. Ch.II), 
eh.XV (esp. pp.181-2), pp.360-62; T & R, pp. 
114-1'7, 257, 329. 
54. 
(although their ultimate distinction for Brad.lay 
appears to be a matter of emphasia), but it .follows 
from the nature and definition of truth that , if it 
is to be conceived as all-inclusive and consistent, 
this truth can have existence only within such a 
systematic whol~ as that which constitutes reality. 
7. 	Thought ane! Reality: 
A third inference has been drawn from this 
apparent dichotomy of' thOllght and reality: namely, 
that since thought is relational and reality non-
relational, thought paJ.' ticular and reality univer­
sal, then thought can never even approach a com­
7 
prehension 01' description of reality. Bradley 
holds, however, that the analysis of judgment gives 
evidence of an internal character of judgment which 
accepts or rejects Judgments according to their 
8 
ability to satisfy the intellect. Inasr!ll~ch as the 
satisfaction of the intell ect can be attained only 
in reality, we must then sny that this character of 
Judgment is, to a degree at least, a manner of recog­
7. This is essentially the position of the Agnostics, 

who thus formulate the metaphysics (if it really 

is metaphysics) consistent with empirical logic. 

8. T 	& R, Po 39l. 
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nizing or perceiving reality. It is the transce~d­
once of the 	relational judgmental form by the judg­
9 
ment itself. Just how gratuitous this explanation 
is on Bradley's part we shall not questioa. 
Bradley's position here rests upon definition 
of terms. the recognition that there is a vast dif­
ference between the admission of thought's inability 
to attain reality and the statement that it cannot 
10 
comprehend reality. At first glance it may appear 
that Bradley has set up an opposition between thought 
and reality which makes even contact between the two 
impossible. How is thought. whose substance is par­
ticular. existent terms. ever to attain that ultimate. 
universal. non-relational reality which alone makes 
possible the reduction of that reality to the level 
of discursive reason; that is. to the judgment? To 
understand the manner in which Bradley conceives 
reality to find expression in thought. it is neces­
9. T & R. p.391. 
10. 	E.~ •• compare the statement of Bradley in reply 
to Pro.fessor Stout If •••• that no one. except Prof. 
Bosanquet. has emphasized more strongly than my­
self the impossibility of thinking anything 
whieh is unreal". T & R. p.276. 
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sary to bear in mind two facts: first, that non­
rolational does not mean undifferentiated; and sec­
ond, that contact with reality is just as essential 
to the nature of thought as the attainment of reality 
~
is rendered impossible Ez the nature of thought. It 
1s quite impossible to conceive a unity which is not 
differentiated, and the so-called contradictoriness 
of a non-relational, differentiated unity arises from 
the confusion of relatlonallty and dlfferentiatioIl. 
Further, a confusion has arisen through the 
contention of some critics, the realists in partic­
ular, that only those things which are r eal could be 
actual or possible objects of knowledge. Now that 
whleh Bradley has described as appearance is a 
possible object for the knowing process, and the fact 
that it is an ideal construct in 	no way affects its 
11 
status as an object of knowledge. In fact, the 
difficulty lies, not in the attempt to e.xplain how 
the thing of appearance becomes an object of know­
ledge, but rather in the investigation of how reality 
itself can be conceived as objectified and accessible 
12 
to thought. 
11. Logic, note p.7, p.10; A & R, p.453. 
12. Cf., Eaton, R.M., S~bolism and Truth, Cambridge,
1 5, p.89. 
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For Bradley, then, the problem of truth has its 
genesis in the question of how thought makes contact 
with reality and how it proceeds in the attempt to 
identify thought and reality and thus attain satis­
faction; for, despite the apparent hopelessness of 
the attempt, thought nevertheless continues to man­
ifest the desire to unite and identify the subject 
and predicate of judgment. This Bradley explains by 
reference to the nature of judgment. 
Judgment is formal, but it consists of terms 
which are particular, and here arises the difficulty 
of distinguishing the form, content, and activity of 
the judgment. Terms have no meaning whatsoever until 
expressed in judgmental form; that is, until their 
relation is made explicit. Therefore, this relation 
expressed in judgment must be something more than the 
mere relation of one term to another term by similar­
ity, contiguity, or association. This would be the 
admission that the meaning-content of terms was con­
tained in those terms and would result in the defini­
tien of knowledge as the recognition of mere causal 
13 
connection, a vie~ not supported by the facts. The 
judgment then expresses a meaning not to be found in 
13. LogiC, Bk.II, Ch.I. 
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its terms taken individually or collectively, nor in 
the causal relation of those terms. 
Thus is formulated, in simple terms, the problem 
of knowledge, not only for Bradley, but for all theo­
ries which find themselves compelled to advance beyond 
mere psychology. The problem in religious mysticism, 
for example, is the explanation of a knowledge-content 
in the mystical experience which cannot be explained 
by simple reference to the terms of that e~perience. 
When the attempt is made to explain or validate mystl­
cal kriowledge by a mere reference to the terms of the 
experience, the whole system ends in an appeal to an 
irrational faith, the formulation of a perfect ~etitio. 
This should make clear that there is a problem of 
knowledge common to mysticism and to philosophy, at 
least to that philosophy which has been called ideal­
ism: namely, the question of immediate experience as 
the source of the reality-content of judgment, of a 
non-relational unity as the ground of the function 
and formulation of discursive reason and mediate ex­
perience. 
An examination of the route traveled by mystiCism 
and philosophy in the investigat10n of knowledge will 
show that both travel the same road for a time. Let 
. 
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us hurriedly pass along this road with them to the 
cross-roads where their ways part. The given fact 
from which we start is that experience, and experi­
ence only, is the source of any knowledge whatsoever. 
The problem then is to de.fine experience, and this 
task may best be approached by an analysis of know­
ledge and the act of knowing in order to determine 
what constitutes this experience which makes knowledge 
possible. Assuredly we must recognize the content of 
physical fact in knowledge, and here we must depend 
upon psychology to furnish details. We need not tarry 
with these details. however, for all that is involved 
in th.1s stage of our journey is mere description of 
physical and physiological fact. The cruder types of 
mysticism and epistemology are satisfied to stop here 
and rest, content with the beautiful scenery; but a 
glimpse of the endless road stretChing into the dis­
tance convinces us that we have barely begun our 
journey. 
Knowledge is not explained by psychological de­
scription; there is a difference of content between 
fact and meaning; and the insistence of the mystic 
that we accept his experience as fact evades the 
problem of its validity as knowledge. The recogni­
tion of this implication forces us to leave our 
60. 
fellow travelers. who take a side road into the 
Valley of Content. while we push on to a rougher and 
harder road. We have yet to explain the unity of 
knowledge. the mamler in which terms are related. 
for it is only from 'I;he solution of this problem 
that we can derive a criterion for the validity of 
knowledge. 
Ass~mg that the essence of judgment is its 
content of meaning or knowledge. what then shall we 
say of the ground or source of that meaning? Clearly 
i 'l; is not to be found in the terms of the judgment 
nor in the relations which the judgment expresses. 
Relations may indeed be evidences of the ground for 
which we seek. but they themselves could not. of 
course. be that ground. 
Apparently we are left with but two alternatives: 
either the act of judgment is a creative activity and 
hence not formal. or terms and relations do not con­
stitute the entire content of judgment. Bradley re­
solves this dilemma dialectically by absorbing both 
alternatives in his discussion of inference and its 
relation to judgment. Concerning the first alterna­
tive, that of the actIvity of the judgment, it might 
be well to point out that, although we do call the 
judgment all "act" of thought, yet judgment proper is 
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rather the expression or formulation of thought tmd 
not itself the activity. This is not always clearly 
expressed in Bradley's work and the ambiguous rep­
resentation of judgment as an "act" of thought is 
the source of much misundersttmding. 
The operation or function of the intellect is 
of the nature of inference, and Bradley agrees that 
explicit inference is a conscious operation whose 
activity ends in the judgment. In other words, judg­
ment is not inference, but the formulation of the 
product of inference. Inference is the activity of 
the intellect, the act of knowing; judgment is the 
statement of the inferential relation, the assertion 
of knOWledge. Judgment is the form which all infer­
ence must take, and this is what was .eant when it 
was said that judgment is the assertion of the re­
lation of facts. Judgment may give us the formal 
content of knowledge, but it can never explain the 
source or activity of knowing. We are forced back 
to a description of the process of inference, and 
it is his treatment of inference which constitutes 
what is perhaps Bradley's outstanding contribution 
to the history of thought. His treatment is pro­
found and unique, e~denced by the fact that a 
contemporary of the capacity of Bosanquet frankly 
~ 
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admits that he was some time in understanding its 
14 
fUll significance. 
8. Reality in Immediate Experience: 
Here, at last, after our rather extended intro­
duction to Bradley, do we come face to face with his 
postulation of immediate experience as the ground of 
inference; but, after thus following his investiga­
tion to this pOint, the place which will be given to 
immediacy within his system becomes perfectly evident. 
The subject of inference is terms, and the process of 
inference is the relating of those terms. This much 
is clear from the statement above, and, as we have 
pOinted out, this entire procedure is relational, 
discursive, and therefore incomplete and to this de­
gree incoherent. Wh.ence, then, comes that unity which 
we have agreed must characterize knowledge and all 
statements thereof? 
\ There is, says Bradley, and must be, an under-
l 
lying unity and totalIty which 1s the ground and 
presupposition of all mediate exper:Lence. No mental 
state of any type or kind is conceivable unless we 
grant the actual and re8.l existence. of this unity 
14. ~. cit., p.115. 
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as the totality within which the differences and 
relations of these mediated states (inferences) 
find their differentiation. It would be an un­
warranted and tedious digresslon for us to attempt 
here a justification of Bradley's fundamental posi­
ticn that differentiation or relationality is con­
ceivable only on the assumpt :ton of' a unity within 
which d1fferenoes and relations lie or' fall. In the 
preceding outline of his thought, this point has 
been made clear, and, for the present at least, the 
reader must be content to accept this dual and 
mutu.al implicat i on of unity and relationa11ty as 
J " one of Bradley's presuppositions • . , . 
One thing at least 1s clear: namely, that this 
necessitated unity cannot be conveyed, represented, 
or contained in thought or reason. At this point 
the Bradle1an is forced to agree with the tradition­
al mystic that, to this extent, thougbt is impotent; 
that neither thought, reason, intellect, nor logic 
is capable of giving us contact with, or knowledge 
of, reality. The point made by Bradley, however, is 
that it is the nature and operation of the intellect 
as inference, formulated in judgment, which pOints 
------~•. 
(i5. For a crit1.cism of Bradley's "presupposltions" 
~ see Maointosh, D.D., The Problem ?f Knowledge, 
New York, 1915, p.379. 
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the way to our recognition or the means whereby we 
do attain and know reality. It is the rulalysls or 
inference that tells us exactly what it is we are 
s eeking as the reality-content of judgment, and 
without th:l.s guide we would never be able to recog­
nize or discover the true nature of this reality­
ccntent. The mystic's rulswel' would be, then, that 
all such investigation is nonsense. You have admit­
ted our contention, he might say, but wish to cover 
your tracks with the dust of abstractions ruld the 
fog ot theoretil:cal vagaries. I think we will be 
forced to adrait that the mystic has, temporarily at 
least, disturbed the logical foundation of Bradley's 
system, inasmuch as Bradley does not say that reality 
is interred, but consistently maintains his contention 
16
that reality appears to us in and through feeling. 
The fail.ure to recognize reality as inferred 
excludes fronl thought ruld reason the capacity to 
attain reality, and Bradley is forced to the posi­
tion that tbe only other function to which we can 
attribute this capacity to represent reality is 
feeling. Thus, that unity which validates all know­
ledge becomes, in terms of experience, anfelt-unity" 
(£6. Logic, Bk.III, Pt.II, Ch.IV; LBsfl., Ch.VIII,p.333. 
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or "felt-totality". This function is embodied in a
--- . 
specific type of experience, different in kind from 
the mediate form of discursive reason. Feeling is 
immediate in nature; the experience itself is in 
the nature of completeness and unity. This does not 
mean that feeling is merely the vehicle appropriate 
to the representation of reality, for it is just the 
reality-content of this felt-unity which gives to it 
its character of inunediacy. 
On this point we must also insist that, although 
our analysis of thought drives 1-1S to the postulation 
of this unity, we are not thereby justified in claim­
ing that reality is a mere presupposition necessitated 
by our need of a ground upon which to rest the dif­
ferenees discovered as essential to thought or infer­
ence. Bradley defines immediacy as that experience 
in which no distinction is made between the aware­
ness and the object of the awareness. In feeling, 
subject and object are identified, and there is no 
distinction between the act of knowing and the end 
of the knowing process; but immediate experience is 
still experience, and the feeling of unity or total­
ity which evidences reality is something of which we 
are actually aware. Further, the awareness of immed­
iate experience is no less cogent or real than the 
66. 
attent1.on of mediate thought, to which mediacy we are 
prone to limit the term 'awareness'. In fact, we are 
almost forced to say that it is only the awareness of 
immediate experience that is real, that feeling is 
the actual source of any awareness we can have. Im­
mediate experience, then, is a valid cognitive func­
17
tion. 
By a subtle misinterpretation of Bradley, we 
might find it possible to involve him, on this pOint, 
in the famous, or infamous, ego-centric predicament, 
the nemesis of idealistic epistemologists. If reality 
is presented in immediate experience or feeling, and 
immediacy is defined as absolute unity, as an experi­
I 
ence in which there is no distinction between knowing 
~ 
and object known, between awareness and that .of which 
it is aware - if all this be admitted, then what can 
p~event us from carrying the argument to its logical 
conclusion and saying that the feeling is reality? 
If this primitive feeling of immediacy, this felt­
unity, is reality, it is nonsense to. say that thought, 
which is only possible on the assumption of the actu­
slity of this feeling, attempts to attain reality, 
unle88 we mean that thought is continually attempting 
17. T & R, Ch. VI, XIV. 
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to reduce itselr to feeling. On this view we must 
admit that thought is the thorn in the flesh and 
that logic is not only useless, but a positive 
h:l.ndrance to the reality aspiration. 
Bradley was careful to provide against any such 
criticism of his theory of reality. Such criticism 
fails to interpret correctly the terms of his argu­
ment, terms upon whose precise definition he was 
always so careful to insist. Reality is an infinite 
given whole, and to say that such is contained in 
the knowing subject is contradictory. To be sure, 
the finite self is a centre which manifests this 
felt-totality, but it is unjustifiable to conclude 
that the self' thererore contains the whole of reality. 
If this were true there would be no conflict between 
tho"l~ght and reality, for thought should be able to 
18 
comprehend,all wi thin the finite centre of self. 
The unity, coherence, and inclusiveness which 
belong by nature to reality find concrete manifes­
tation within the finite centre of the selr. It 
follows that this manifestation will be restricted 
by the nature of the selr, which is finite, incom­
plete, and un-harmonious; but it would be fallacious 
18. T & R, p.18G. 
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to say that the reality which we know is thererore 
incomplete and finite. Such would not be reality. 
What we can and must say is that reality must as­
sume a particular, rinite form in order to be known. 
This problem of the mannel' in which reaU.ty is con­
tained in l:romediate experience and or how it becomes 
an object for thought is one of the most difficult 
Bradley has to face, and his treatment of it is not 
exactly lucid at all points. ask how re­
nlity becomes an object for feeling, for we have 
already painted out that in immediate experience 
there is no distinction between the object and the 
feeling. In immediate experience we have a feeling 
of unity, not a knowledge of it; reality is present 
in feeling, not set off from it as ~ Object.j In 
other words, Bradley is forced to admit the dis­
tinction of thought and feeling, and it is the 
apparent absoluteness of this distinction that 
raises the question of how we know feeling and its 
content; that is, how immediate experience becomes 
an object for thought. This is made particularly 
difficult by our recent conte.ntion that thought 
and reason can never get entirely beyond immediate 
experience, that our felt-unity is the necessary 
ground of all discursive reason and mediate experi­
69. 

ence; for it me'ans that innnediate experi,ence must~ 
in a sense~ become an object for itself. On the 
other hand~ this seeming dj.fficulty is the basis of 
our solution of the problem. If feeling is the 
ground from which thought cannot escape~ then the 
distinction between the two can hardly be absolute~ 
and it is not unreasonable to suppose that a knowledge 
relation is possible between the two, supplementing 
1.9 
the relation of dependence. 
Reality ie contained within feeling~ but when­
ever that feeling becomes an object for thought it 
must find expression in the relational, discursive 
for~ which all thought takes. Evidently~ reality in 
the form in which it appears as an object of thought 
will always be incomplete and neither a true nor 
actual representation of reality. Nevertheless~ we 
are forced~ by the very incompleteness of this object~ 
to set up an idea of reality as ultimate totality and 
coherence. In one respect the reality-content of 
thought represents the particularization of reality 
as 	universal; and again~ it might be called the ac­
20
tualization of reality as ideal. 
20. ~R~Pp.32, 251 f. 
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Th:l.s is the ground upon which we may say that 
reality is contained within the judgment. The subject 
o~ every judgment is reality, the "whole o~ reality" 
in ~act; but nevertheless this reality, though whole, 
is limited and conditioned. Ideally, reality is 
whole, complete, and unconditioned; but as expressed 
in judgment - that is, as actualized in thought­
forms - reality is limited and conditioned by those 
forms and is to this extent incomplete. Reality, 
therefore, in its entirety remains an ideal, exter­
nal to thought and the judgment, and never possible 
of attainment. Bradley admits thiS, inSisting that 
i
the continued dialect1;cal development of thought 
toward a system o~ knowledge is, in its progress, 
constructing a system of knowledge which approximates 
more and more to an understanding and ~ormulation o~ 
absolute reality. It is evident that the mOl'e exten­
sive and precise are our definitions of the terms 
in judgment the more nearly will these terms approach 
identity. H~.s evidence of what was previously 
referred to as Bradleyls "negative" use of the dia­
l-eeti-c. In the development of thought the opposition 
evidenced in diversity provides the ground of higher 
syntheses, but the dialectical process does not pro­
71. 
ceed toward reality. as Hegel thought. Rather it is 
the opposition between thought and reality which is 
the very essence and origin of the entire dialecti­
21 
cal 	process. 
We ~~st agree that this is not a very satisfac­
tory conclusion to our investigation of knowledge 
and experience. Bradley transports us with pains­
taking care to the realm of scepticism and then 
leaves us with the simple explanation that he has 
shown us the entire road so far, that neither he nor 
we have any means of transportation along whatever 
road may stretch ahead. even though we can partially 
discern the limits of that road. Such is the situa­
tion. says Bradley. and rather than pervert the facts 
or carry you off on a blind road, I have defeated my 
own end and failed to find our destination of intel­
lectual satisfaction. At any rate. he might add. an 
intelligent acepticism is ~ch to be preferred to an 
irrational contentment. "There is no Sin, however 
prone to it the philosopher may be, which philosophy 
22 
can justify so little as spiritual pride~ 
21. 	LogiC, p.379 f.; ~~, Ch.VI,XI; A & R, eh.XXIV. 
See also Muirhead, J.E., ~ Platonic Tradition 
in Anglo-Saxon Philosophy, New York, 1931,pp.289­
291, 298-300. 
22. 	A & R, p.7. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE VALIDITY OF IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE 
The material for this discussion has been very 
definitely limited ·to one particular phase of the 
general problem of knowledge: namely, that con­
cerning the validity of immediate experience as a 
source or method of knowledge. Bradley was selected 
as presenting the best example of a consistent, 
philosophical formulation of this problem. In con­
clusion, then, I shall summarize very briefly 
Bradley's formulation of immediate experience as a 
method of knowledge and indicate what appears to roe 
to be the major problem which his statement leaves 
unsolved, 
9. Summary £f Bradley's Argwnent: 
In a general sense, Bradley's system leaves us 
with the same difficulty as that encountered in our 
examination of Spinoza's metaphysics. Each of these 
thinkers maintains the idealist position of postu­
lating metaphysical monism as the grotmd of thought 
and experience. Neither of them, however, finds it 
(72 ) 
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poesibla to avoid dualism in epistemology; and in 
the end they leave us with an unrasolved contradic­
tion between their metaphysics and epistemology. This 
contradiction is especially stimulating because it is 
evident from tha nature of the case ·.that there should 
not, in the final analysis, be any distinction other 
than one of emphasis between cosmic theory and the 
theory of knowledge. The situation is not relieved 
by the recognition or the paradoxical fact that the 
postulation of metaphysical monism becomes necessary 
only upon the recognition of epistemological plural­
ism. We may say that if knowledge does exist, then 
it must take the dialectical form of thought, and 
from this sitllation or fact we might derive the ne­
cessity for a grpund in the rorm or absolute unity; 
but the mere abstract postulation of a relation, even 
though logically necessary, serves neit:h.er to explain 
nor to describe that relation. Abstract justification 
cannot be substituted fOI' concrete descript I on. This 
indicates the only valid distinctIon between meta­
physics and epistemology: namely, the fact that meta­
physics is content if the logical necessity or reality 
can be proved, whereas epistemology cannot rest short 
of a description of reality in its relation to thought 
and the knowledge process. 
Therefore, it is this very distinction which serves 
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as the ground of the identification of metaphys:l.,~s 
and epiatemology in the problem of reality or sub­
stance. Epistemology is primarily concerned with an 
investigation a.nd description of the knowledge pro­
cass; but whenever such explanatIon advances beyond 
mere psychological classificatIon, the immediate 
questIon becomes that of the rea1 ity of knowledge, 
indicat:!.ng thereby the metaphysIcal problem of the 
nature of reality. Thus it is tha.t any epistemology 
worthy of the name is of necessity a metaphysics. In 
.like manner, philosophy as a body of thought has, 
throughout its entire history, found itself forced 
to the problem of reality or substance as the ulti­
mate and major problem of speculation. The ultImate 
end or synthesis of all philosophical investigation 
ruld speculation is an explanation of the nature of 
reality. In particular is this true of Bradley's 
philosophy. Every particular argument :!.n his entire 
work suggests, points to, and finally culminates in 
the conception of reality which is the implicit end 
of his speculation. 
The point from which Bradley starts his specu­
lation concerning the nature of reality is the recog­
nition of thought's inherent desire to find certitude, 
satisfaction, and completion for itself and its ao­
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tlvity. This, says Bradley, could be contained in no 
less an inclusive whole than reality. His argument 
concerning reality, and it is this argument which 
constitutes the fundamental premise for his whole 
syst~m, may be briefly summarized as follows: 
1. 	Reality, as unity, completeness, and 
satisfaction, is a logical necessity 
to thought and experience; 
2. 	Neither thought nor logic has the ca­
pacity to attain, nor even completely 
to express, that reality; 
3. 	The only alternative mode of appre­
hending reality is feeling; therefore, 
4. 	The reality-content of thought, reason, 
and experience is presented in and 
through feel:l.ng. 
Thus, in outlining Bradley's description of the 
knowledge process and function as well as his ex­
planation of the validity of immediate experience, 
the previous chapter shows clearly the peculiar dif­
ficulty involved in his essential and implicit def­
inition of reality, a definition which makes neces­
sary his apparent recourse to, and reliance upon, 
immediate experience or feeling as a source of know~ 
ledge. So it seems that Bradley's system manifests a 
paradoxical inconsistency: though his method is con­
fessedly and obviously logical, Bradley appears forc.d 
1n the end to posit feeling as the only source of our 
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knowledge of reality. and feeling could hardly. by any 
stretch of imagination. be called a method. much less 
logical method. Bradley the logician is then su~ject 
to the acousation of confusing his logic with the 
simplest kind of mystioism. and it would seem that 
he has left himself open to the criticism of Suder­
mann's Mad Professor by constructing a philosophy 
"engaged in the sorry business of smuggling in the 
back door what was thrown out the front". Although 
having declared himself formally wedded to Logic. 
Bradley cannot resist the temptation to carryon a 
clandestine affair with the mistress Mysticism; but 
his fundamental method is not suited to deception. 
and he is finally forced to admit the contradictory 
and deplorable state of affaira. to find himsel! 
paying homage to two loves. impelled on ~he one side 
by obligation and on the other by desire. 
What then shall be our final estimate and cri­
ticism of Bradley's epistemology? Shall we accept 
the statement that immediate experience. as feeling. 
is the sole source and means by which we know and 
recognize reality. that the necessary ground of 
thought and experience is a "fel't-unity or "~­
totality"? This "recognition of immediate experi­
ence as the source of our contact with reality" is 
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the first stage of philosophical mysticism; and if we 
grant that Bradley advances thu.s far, then we must 
also admit that he takes the second step: namely, 
the formulation of that immediate experience nin 
the logical form of the judgment" in order to give 
meaning and intelligibility to immediacy. It would 
seem, then, that we are justified in calling Bradley 
a mystic; and in recognition of, and deference to, 
his logical formulation, we may be justified in fur­
ther terming hlm a philosophical .lI1Ystic. 
10. Immediate ~perlence ~ reeling: 
Before definitely deciding this point, let me 
remind the reader of an important statement made at 
the very beginning of our discussion (p.ll f.); 
namely, that which pointed out the essential contra­
dictoriness of the terms mediate and immediate as 
used in connection with mysticism. Immediate experi­
ence, we said, 1s unmediated, non-I'elational, and of 
the nature of pure feeling. Thus it is a pure or mere 
state of feeling which mysticism attempts to make a 
valid mode of knowledge. This is perhaps the most im.. 
portant single point in our en·tire discussion: the 
realization that, for mysticism, the distinction be­
tween mediate and immediate experience is as absolute 
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as any distinction can be; that these terms are, as 
we stated in the beginning, contradictories and not 
contraries. Mediate refers to thought or reason, in­
dicating the presence of terms, relatedness, and in­
completeness of a dialectical nature; immediate .re­
fers to feeling, indicating the absence of terms as 
such, unrelatedness, and a completeness or unity of 
a type distinctly non-dialectical and non-progress­
ive. The assertion of the validity of immediate ex­
perience as a method of knowledge is then the asser­
'tion of the priority of feeling over reason, at least 
in a particular case, as a source or mode of knowing. 
The particular case in which immediate apprehension 
claims validity over reason is that which concerns 
our knowledge of reality. In this respect we must re­
alize that philosophical mysticism is not an organic 
or synthetic co-ordination of the methods of phil­
osophy and mysticism; philosophy is not made mysti­
cal, nor is mystiCism made philosophical. Consider­
able effort was made to avoid antiCipating this con­
clusion; but even in the definition of philosophical 
mysticism (p.46) it is quite apparent that the demand 
for the formulation of immediate experience in logi­
cal form constitutes a tacit attempt to reduce mysti­
cism to philosophy. We have continually emphasized 
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the essential contradiction between the method of 
philosophy and that of mysticism, and this contradic­
tion prevents any real synthesis of the two. In so 
far as the philosopher relies on mystici~m, he is 
thuB far not a philosopher (Cf.,p.22 f.). In accept­
- . 
ing feeling as a method of knowledge. he is rejecting 
reason and logic and thus turning aside from philos­
ophy, for logic is the only method of knowledge rec­
ognized by philosophy as valid. 
Now it is true that philosophy must accept as 
material for investigation the data of all the various 
sciences and disciplines. and it was in this sense 
that we defined philosophical mysticism as the accept­
ence of immediate experience as a method of knowledge
• 
subject to philosophical investigation. Our discus­
sion has shown, however, that such investigation im­
mediately resolves into tIle task of attempting to 
give the data of immediate apprehension some degree 
of logical form. for only when. and if, this can be 
dODe are we justified in accepting the data of mysti­
cism as valid for philosophy, and immediate experi­
ence as epistemological method. 
Bradley's peculiar importance to the present dis­
cussion lies in his successful demonstration of tIle 
fact tllat the data of mysticism. the facts of immedi­
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ate experience, do not lend themselves to formulation 
in the logical, judgmental form. Thus we said "in 
deference to" Bradley's logic we call him a philosoph­
_~ mystic, for it is obvious that the term is a 
misnomer, constituting a contradiction in terms. 
Philosophical mysticism, then, consists of the attempt 
to hold, at one and the same time, two contradictory 
and opposed theories of lmowledgej and although the 
process of such formulation is extremely valuable for 
the history of thought, it is hardly conducive to 
that satisfaction of the intellect which Bradley held 
to be the inherent demand of thought. 
Shall we then consider the importance of Bradley's 
work to lie in the fact that he formulated an ultimate 
contradiction, that he held to a consistent logical 
method in epistemology but forsook logic for feeling 
in his metaphysics, and thereby proved that logic and 
feel:ing, mediate and immediate experience, philosophy 
and mysticism, are essentially different and distinct 
and can never be brought together? To so estimate 
Bradley would, I think, be unjust. That such is the 
essence of his system might be assumed from a super­
ficial examination of his work or might be argued by 
selecting certain phrases and sentences in isolation 
from the body of his thought and method. Further, 
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such an interpretlttion will be justified as long as 
we insist upon interpreting his term immediate in the 
"'",....----­
sense in which mysticism uses the word. Bradley is 
tbe outstanding example of a philosopber who intends 
by immediate to indicate a contrary rf.lther than a 
contradictory of EIediate (9.£., p.l1 i. 
To such an inte!'pretation there may be raised 
a justifiable objection: namely, that Bradley him­
self uses innnediate in a sense synonomous with feel­
ing, as evidenced by bis terms "felt-unity" and "felt­
totality". If Bradley did nol1 mean tbat reality is ap­
prehended by an experience of immediacy as feeling, 
then why did he conshltently select the terms feeling 
and felt to express bis meaning? Certainly this would 
be an avoidable and inexcusable ambiguity to be charged 
to him. As indicated in the previous chapter, he very 
definitely states that because the nature of thought 
is such as to render impossible its apprehension of 
rea11.ty, then reality can and must be experienced 
only by some power or faculty which transcends thou.ght, 
and this he describes as feeling. The experience which 
comprehends reB.lity is therefore an experience of 
innnBdiacy. 
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11. ~ Persisting Problem: 
The solution of this contradiction :1.8 really not 
so difficult as it seems. It consists merely of de­
fining terms, or rather, of recognizing the defini­
tion given them by Bradley. Again we appeal to his 
whole system as furnishing the only satisfactory 
explanation of particular problems arising within 
that system. There is no hope of understanding 
Bradley's appeal to immediate experience until recog­
l1i tion is made of the peculiar sense in which he de­
fines feeling. This is especially difficult because 
Bradley excludes from feeling that characteristic 
which in ordinary usage is taken as its very essence~ 
subjectivity. In the terminology of mysticism~ the 
essence and substance of immediacy as feeling is 
subjectivity; hence its adaptability to psychologi­
cal explanation. For Bradley, however, subjectivity 
is not only considered non-essential to the function 
of feeling, but is actually a characteristic which 
it would be difficult to attribute to immediate ex­
perience. ,Vhen he says that the immediate experience 
of reality transcends thought, Bradley means just 
that it transcends subjectivity in the ordinary 
psychological sense. 
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The question then arise s concerning the sort of 
definition which can be given feeling as exclusive of 
subjectivity. To understand the problem involved her~, 
it is necessary to go beyond Bradley's own statement. 
Now this does not mean to imply that Bradley did not 
realize the implications of his statement of the 
problem of knowledge and of reality; but it does 
mean that he left a very definite problem unformu­
lated. Perhaps this particular problem would have 
been more adequately and completely stated if Bradley 
had written his ~thical ,Studies last instead of first. 
The probleln upon which depends the definition 
of immediacy and feeling as used by Bradley is that 
of indivIduality or the individual. Coinciding with 
the psychological description of feeling as essen­
tially subjective, is the philosophically naIve ex~ 
planation of the individual as ,a subjective entity. 
Bradley recognizes, impliCitly, that upon such a 
description of the individual it is quite impossible 
to give any consistent definition or explanation of 
individuation. 
Reality must be individual, for the real is 
that which exists independently, that which depends 
upon nothing else for its substance or existence; 
8.4. 
and this is exactly wl~t individuality means. How 
then can we speak of any finite centre as an individ­
ual when manifestly all such centres are mere attri­
butes or appearances of reality? Reality its.eli' is 
the only true example of individuality. Thus the 
problem of knowledge, of how we know reality, of the 
manner in wl1ich we become cognizant of the ground of 
thought end experience, is really formulated by 
Bradley as the problem of ir,dividuation. The prin­
ciple of individuation is the mode or manner by 
which thought, evidenced in f:!.n:t tEl centres called 
selves, attains reaJ.ity, and this mode or manner is 
oalled by Bradley feeling or immediate experience. 
It is so called because it is plainly not of 
the nattwe of discursive reason; but this is not to 
say that reason and thought are not a part of its 
nature. A .!!ine ~a !!2!! need not be exclusively so, 
and the mode of attaining reality is no more neces­
sarily nor essentially of the nature of feeling 
than of the nature of thought. It can b~ neither 
pure feelir,g nor mere discursive reason. It seems 
reasonable to suppose that Bradley would have done 
much to clear his work of confUsion and ambiguity 
had he coined some new word to indicate more exactly 
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what he intended by feeling and immediate experience. 
That be did not mean to imply that reality is appre­
hended by a subjective, mystic(I.l experience of pure 
feeling appears self-evident. From the point of view 
of philosophical investigation, at least, be has 
quite successfUlly demonstrated the inadequacy and 
contradictoriness of mysticism as a mode of knowledge. 
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